R.D. Andrus v.The State of  Utah : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
R.D. Andrus v.The State of Utah : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John S. Boyden; John Paul Kennedy; George J. Romney; Attorneys for Appellants.
Merlin R. Lybbert; David W. Slagle; B. L. Dart Jr; Ralph L. Jerman; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Andrus v. Utah, No. 13716.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/877
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF U^f^H1975 
AM YOUNG UNIVERSITY R. D. ANDRUS, VIRGINIA M. ANDRUS, JAN W r " l .
 B , „ „ . , 
BATES, ANN K. BATES, LLOYD N. BECKSTEAp,DJuben Clark LiW SchOOl 
JUNE H. BECKSTEAD, JESSE N. BENSON, ESTELEX T 
D. BENSON, BRUCE R. BOWTHORPE, MARILYN 
R. BOWTHORPE, ROBERT P. CARLISLE, NORMA 
DEAN CARLISLE, ARTHUR CHILD, EDITH C 
CHILD, CHARLES F. CONTANT, AGNES A. CON-
TANT, GENE V. CRAWFORD, SHERRY T. CRAW-
FORD, GARY A. FLANDRO, CHERI P. FLANDRO, 
IRWIN C. GLASER, FRAYDELL Z. GLASER, THOM-
AS E. HAGERMAN, JOYCE L. HAGERMAN, KEITH 
H. HARDY, ANNETTE H. HARDY, RONALD C. 
JONES, JOHANNA JONES, F. SCOTT KIRK, PEARL 
B. KIRK, CLYDE B. KIRKHAM, ERMA KIRKHAM, 
ROBERT P. KUNKEL, FRANCES KUNKEL, EUGENE 
C. LLOYD, LAURIE LLOYD, BARNARD J. Mc-
ENTEE, ELIZABETH C. McENTEE, WILLIAM J. 
MERBACK, GLORIA D. MERBACK, HEBER C. PET-
ERSON, CAROLYN T. PETERSON, ELEANOR E. 
PRADO, EDWIN A. READ, JOY E. READ, CECIL O. 
SAMUELSON, JANET M. SAMUELSON, NISHAN H. 
SHERANIAN, MARILYNN J. SHERANIAN, FAR-
RELL M. SMITH, SANDRA R. SMITH, ANGUS K. 
SPROUL, FRANK M. STEINHARDT, EVA STEIN-
HARDT, RICHARD R. TWELVES, VIRGINIA HALE 
TWELVES, SHIRL J. VARTY, RAMONA VARTY, 
J. ROBERT WELCH, DOROTHY K. WELCH, 
CLAUDE L. WESTENSKOW, and GLADYS B. WEST-
ENSKOW, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH and its DEPARTMENT OF HIGH 
WAYS, SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the State of Utah, and GIBBONS & REED CO., a 
Utah corporation, Defendants-Respondents, 
> 
Case No. 
13716 
ROBERT J CAMERON, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
I P. GIBBONS, dba GIBBONS & REED CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY, the STATE OF UTAH, a sovereign, 
and the COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
RICHARD GROTEPAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
J. P. GIBBONS, dba GIBBONS & REED CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY, and the STATE OF UTAH, a 
sovereign, Defendants-Respondents, 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATE OF UTAH AND SALT LAKE COT 
Continued inside front cover. 
&PR7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. euben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appeal from Judgment Entered by Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., 
Judge in The District Court of Salt Lake County. 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
David W. Slagle 
7th Floor, Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents, 
State of Utah and Salt Lake County 
John S. Boyden 
John Paul Kennedy 
George J. Romney 
Suite 1000, 10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs*Appellants 
Ralph L. Jerman 
B. L. Dart, Jr. 
430 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents. 
Gibbons & Reed Co. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . .L.. 2 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 3 
ARGUMENT — ,,.,... .. ...... t ; 
POINT I — THE COURT PROPERLY EN-
TERED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY 6 
A. THE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO 
GRANT JUDGMENT N.O.V. WHERE 
THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 6 
B. THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED 
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE JURY FINDINGS 
AGAINST SALT LAKE COUNTY 8 
C. SALT LAKE COUNTY IS IMMUNE 
FROM SUIT UNDER THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE 19 
POINT II — PLAINTIFFS CANNOT RE-
COVER UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF IN-
VERSE CONDEMNATION 24 
POINT III — THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
STATE 25 
A. THE JURY DID NOT FIND THAT THE 
STATE OF UTAH WAS GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE 26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
' Page 
B. GOVEENMENTAL IMMUNITY WAS 
NOT WAIVED FOE THE PLANNING 
:: OF 1-215, SINCE PLANNING IS A DIS-
CEETIONAEY FUNCTION 27 
:
 C. THE STATE OF UTAH CANNOT BE 
HELD LIABLE FOE INADEQUATE IN-
SPECTION 29 
POINT IV — THE COUET EEEED IN NOT 
ENTEEING JUDGMENT FOE INDEMNITY 
AGAINST GIBBONS & EEED COMPANY 30 
CONCLUSION 33 
CASES CITED 
Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 205,398 P.2d 
207,208 (1965) 32 
Bunting Tractor Co. v. Emmett D. Ford Contractors, 
Inc., 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 P.2d 191 (1954) 8 
Carroll v. State, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 
(1972) 22, 29 
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) 22 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 
354 P.2d 105 (1960) 24 
Hampton v. State, 21 Utah 2d 342,445 P.2d 708 
(1968) 25 
Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 
241 P.2d 907, 909 (1953) 25 
Holt v. Utah State Eoad Comm'n., 30 Utah 2d 4, 
511 P.2d 1286 (1973) 24-25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 263, 264, 
420 P.2d 848, 849 (1966) 32 
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 
350 U.S. 61 (1955) 22 
Luke v. American Surety Co., 114 P.2d 950 
(Okla. 1941) 31 
Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 
511 P.2d 517, 519 (Colo. App. 1973) 24 
Salt Lake County v. Liquor Control Comm'n., 
11 Utah 2d 235, 357 P.2d 488 (1960) 11 
Sanf ord v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 
488 P.2d 741 (1971) 8, 20 
Sisley v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 273 
(D. Alas. 1962) 22, 28, 29 
Southern Calif. Gas Co. v. Ventura Pipe Const. Co., 
309 P.2d 849, 851 (Cal. App. 1957) 31 
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 
376 P.2d 100 (1962) 24 
Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R., 24 Utah 2d 217, 
469 P.2d 5 (1970) 21 
Union Pac. R.R. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 
17 Utah 2d 255, 259, 408 P.2d 910, 913 (1965) 32 
STATUTES CITED 
28 U.S.C. 2671, et seq 22, 28 
Sec. 63-30-1, et seq. U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 19, 24 
Sec. 63-30-4, U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 20, 23, 26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
: T! TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
Sec. 63-30-8, U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 19, 26 
Sec. 63-30-9, U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 19, 26 
Sec. 63-30-10, U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 19, 26 
Sec. 63-30-10(1), U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 21 
Sec. 63-30-10(4), U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 23, 30 
Eule 50(b), Utah Eules of Civil Procedure 7 
TEXTS CITED 
41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indemnity, §13 31 
Eestatement of Torts, Second §402A 27 
I * 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
R. D. ANDRUS, VIRGINIA M. ANDRUS, JAN D. 
BATES, ANN K. BATES, LLOYD N. BECKSTEAD, 
JUNE H. BECKSTEAD, JESSE N. BENSON, ESTELLA 
D. BENSON, BRUCE R. BOWTHORPE, MARILYN 
R. BOWTHORPE, ROBERT P. CARLISLE, NORMA 
DEAN CARLISLE, ARTHUR CHILD, EDITH C. 
CHILD, CHARLES F. CONTANT, AGNES A. CON-
TANT, GENE V. CRAWFORD, SHERRY T. CRAW-
FORD, GARY A. FLANDRO, CHERI P. FLANDRO, 
IRWIN C. GLASER, FRAYDELL Z. GLASER, THOM-
AS E. HAGERMAN, JOYCE L. HAGERMAN, KEITH 
H. HARDY, ANNETTE H. HARDY, RONALD C. 
JONES, JOHANNA JONES, F. SCOTT KIRK, PEARL 
B. KIRK, CLYDE B. KIRKHAM, ERMA KIRKHAM, 
ROBERT P. KUNKEL, FRANCES KUNKEL, EUGENE 
C LLOYD, LAURIE LLOYD, BARNARD J. Mc-
ENTEE, ELIZABETH C. McENTEE, WILLIAM J. 
MERBACK, GLORIA D. MERBACK, HEBER C. PET-
ERSON, CAROLYN T. PETERSON, ELEANOR E. 
PRADO, EDWIN A. READ, JOY E. READ, CECIL O. 
SAMUELSON, JANET M. SAMUELSON, NISHAN H. 
SHERANIAN, MARILYNN J. SHERANIAN, FAR* 
RELL M. SMITH, SANDRA R. SMITH, ANGUS K. 
SPROUL, FRANK M. STEINHARDT, EVA STEIN-
HARDT, RICHARD R. TWELVES, VIRGINIA HALE 
TWELVES, SHIRL J. VARTY, RAMONA VARTY, 
J. ROBERT WELCH, DOROTHY K. WELCH, 
CLAUDE L. WESTENSKOW, and GLADYS B. WEST-
ENSKOW, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH and its DEPARTMENT OF HIGH-
WAYS, SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the State of Utah, and GIBBONS & REED CO., a 
Utah corporation, Defendants-Respondents. 
ROBERT J. CAMERON, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
J. P. GIBBONS, dba GIBBONS & REED CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY, the STATE OF UTAH, a sovereign, 
and the COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
RICHARD GROTEPAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
J. P. GIBBONS, dba GIBBONS & REED CONSTRUC-
TION COMPANY, and the STATE OF UTAH, a 
sovereign, Defendants-Respondents. 
> 
Case No. 
13716 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATE OF UTAH AND SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
j NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a claim for property damage 
caused by flooding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A jury trial, on the issue of liability, was had in 
the District Court commencing March 4, 1974. At the 
conclusion of the evidence each of the defendants moved 
for a directed verdict. These motions were denied and 
the case was given to the jury upon a special verdict 
requiring answers to 16 interrogatories (R. 721). 
Based upon the answers returned by the jury, the 
court entered judgment as follows : 
1. Judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against 
the State of Utah. 
2. Judgment in favor of Salt Lake County and 
against the plaintiffs. 
3. Judgment in favor of Gibbons & Reed and 
against the plaintiffs. 
4. Judgment in favor of Gibbons & Reed and 
against the State of Utah and Salt Lake County on the 
crossclaims of the State of Utah and Salt Lake County 
(R.743). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, State of Utah, seeks a reversal of the 
lower court order granting judgment against it and 
2 
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also a reversal of the judgment on its crossclaim against 
Gibbons & Eeed. 
Defendant, Salt Lake County, seeks an affirmance 
of the judgment entered in its favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts in appellants' brief is sub-
stantially accurate, although incomplete, and additional 
facts are, therefore, stated here. 
1. Plaintiffs. 
All of the plaintiffs lived west of the belt route 
(1-215) at the time of the flood. For purposes of the 
litigation, it was assumed that they all sustained some 
water damage. 
2. Chronology. 
A. County Storm Sewer. In 1964, at the request 
of Salt Lake County, the engineering firm of Caldwell, 
Eichards and Sorensen, Inc., prepared a master storm 
drainage study of Salt Lake County. Included were 
recommendations for a drainage system in the area of 
Olympus Cove and the area west of Wasatch Boulevard 
(Ex. 73 at p. 80). In preparing the recommendations the 
following considerations were taken into account: 
(1) The ultimate development in the county 
projected to the year 2000 A.D. 
(2) The contemplated (but unconstructed) 
freeway. 
3 
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(3) Available rainfall intensity studies. 
(4) The estimated runoff based upon a ten 
year storm return frequency. 
In 1966, the engineering firm of Nielsen and Max-
well prepared formal plans for a storm sewer line known 
as "Big Cottonwood Storm Sewer J J, Unit No. 2 " 
which would run from east to west on 4460 South. As 
part of the plan, a lateral was designed to receive storm 
water from the area known as Oak Cliff Drive. This 
differed from the Caldwell, Bichards and Sorensen, Inc., 
Master Plan, primarily because the freeway plans had 
then been formalized, calling for a temporary end of 
the freeway at Oak Cliff Drive. The system was in-
stalled according to the Nielsen and Maxwell plans and 
specifications. The storm drainage system was prepared 
in accordance with acceptable engineering principles. 
B. The Freeway Project. In the spring of 1968, 
the contract for the construction of the freeway was 
awarded to Gibbons & Eeed Construction Company. The 
contract included by reference the Standard Specifica-
tions for Eoad and Bridge Construction, Interim Issue, 
March 1968 (Ex. " B " ) . Further reference to the con-
tract between the State and the contractor will be made 
later. Construction called for removal and temporary 
relocation of Wasatch Boulevard. 
C. Floods. 
(1) On April 3,1969, construction of the free-
way was well underway. Utilities had been relocated 
and structures were in various stages of completion. 
4 
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Large excavated sections of earth were exposed. The 
drainage system of the freeway was partially installed. 
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on that day it 
began to rain. There is no evidence as to the amount of 
rain which fell, but the storm was of moderate inten-
sity. (See B. 1356-57). Plaintiff Kunkel reported some 
flooding of his residential property which was located 
immediately south of 400 South. This was in an area 
substantially removed from the other plaintiffs in this 
action and involved a separate incident. 
(2) By Sunday, August 17, 1969, the freeway 
project was nearing completion. The freeway drainage 
system was installed, the ribbons of concrete roadway 
surface were substantially in place, and the top-soil for 
the cut-slopes had been placed prior to spreading. How-
ever, the cut-slopes were yet to be seeded for erosion 
control and the concrete ditch liners in the median strip 
and the gutters on either side of the freeway were not 
in place. Nor had curb and gutter been installed on 
the relocated Wasatch Boulevard. (B. 1475-76, 1487-88). 
At approximately 5:15 p.m., a thunderstorm 
began to move across the county from southwest to 
northeast. (B. 1611). The storm was of unusual inten-
sity. One observer in the area measured 2% inches of 
rainfall in less than 45 minutes. (B. 1599-1600). Ac-
cording to historic rainfall intensity charts, based upon 
rainfall in Salt Lake County from 1900 (Ex. 82-D, E. 
1614), this was a storm which statistically would occur 
less than once in every 100 years (Ex. 82-D, R.1267-80). 
$ 
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Even the plaintiffs' expert could only document two 
prior cloudbursts in the entire State of Utah that ap-
proached the magnitude of the August 17 storm. (R. 
1310). 
As the course of the storm progressed, sur-
face water began to collect high in the Olympus Cove 
area. It accumulated in ever increasing amounts, and by 
the time it reached relocated Wasatch Boulevard, it was 
of torrent proportions. {See Ex. 117-D). 
Some water ran across Wasatch Boulevard, 
cascaded down the fresh cut-slopes of the freeway project 
and collected in the "grade-sag" at approximately 4600 
South. The water carried with it huge amounts of silt, 
dirt, gravel, and boulders, eroded from the cut-banks of 
the freeway and from above Wasatch Boulevard. 
The eroded material entered and partially 
clogged the freeway drainage system and, in turn, clogged 
the county storm sewer. The grade-sag finally became 
full and the water poured over the west bank of the par-
tially completed freeway and flooded the plaintiffs' 
houses. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY ENTERED JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
A. THE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO 
GRANT JUDGMENT N.O.V. WHERE THE 
. VERDICT IS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE. 
6 
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Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
(b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. Whenever a motion for directed verdict 
made at the close of all the evidence is denied or 
for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed 
to have submitted the action to the jury subject 
to a later determination of the legal questions 
raised by the motion. Not later than ten days 
after entry of judgment, a party who has moved 
for a directed verdict may move to have the 
verdict and any judgment entered thereon set 
aside and to have judgment entered in accord-
ance with his motion for a directed verdict; 
Defendant Salt Lake County made a motion for di-
rected verdict at the close of all the evidence. The jury 
returned its verdict on March 18, 1974. On March 27, 
1974, defendant Salt Lake County filed its motion for 
"Judgment in its Favor and Against the Plaintiffs." 
(R.733). 
The appellant's argument that this Motion does not 
comply with Rule 50(b) is without merit. The rule does 
not state that the Motion cannot be made before the 
judgment; it says only that it cannot be made later than 
10 days after judgment. The fact that the Motion was 
not denominated "Motion for Judgment Notwithstand-
ing the Verdict," or that it was filed before the formal 
judgment was entered does not render it ineffective. 
The plain fact is that the Motion was timely filed by 
defendant iSalt Lake County and seeks judgment in its 
favor, notwithstanding the adverse jury verdict. (R. 733). 
The trial court in entering judgment in favor of Salt 
7 
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Lake County acted within the clear intent of Rule 50(b). 
This principle was succinctly stated in Bunting Tractor 
Co. v. Emmett D. Ford Contractors Inc., 2 Utah 2d 275, 
272 P.2d 191 (1954): 
In entering any judgment it is the duty of the 
court to make such order, not inconsistent with 
the law, as will effectuate justice. . . . This policy 
is not an innovation to our law. It has long been 
embodies in both statutes and decisions that de-
viation from formal procedure shall not work a 
forfetiure of substantive rights in the absence of 
prejudice to the opposing party. 
B. THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT 
THE JURY FINDINGS AGAINST SALT 
LAKE COUNTY. 
The essential elements of a cause of action of this 
nature were defined in Samford v. University of Utah, 
26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971). The plaintiffs' 
assertion that the evidence against Salt Lake County 
brings this case squarely within the holding of Samford 
is inaccurate. 
1. Change in the natural flow of surface water. 
Stated in the plaintiffs' brief (Brief for Appellant at 
20-21), and undisputed by the evidence, is the fact that 
the freeway project changed the natural flow of drain-
age. While this is unquestionably true, there is no evi-
dence or assertion that Salt Lake County was involved 
in any way with authorizing or constructing the free-
way. This was entirely a State project. 
8 
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In an effort to establish this element, the plain-
tiffs rely upon the fact that the County permitted the 
State of Utah to connect the freeway drainage system 
to the Salt Lake County storm sewer. This certainly 
did not change the natural flow of surface water; the 
natural flow was already changed by the construction 
of the freeway. The county's conduct did not cause 
any damage. In fact, it is obvious that the freeway 
drainage system being connected to the storm sewer 
diminished the flooding problem by carrying away a 
substantial portion of the runoff. 
2. Creation of a drainage system. The evidence 
clearly indicates that Salt Lake County carefully plan-
ned, designed, and constructed a storm sewer system in 
an attempt to alleviate a critical drainage problem in 
the Olympus Hills area. 
The evidence indicates that the storm sewer was 
designed according to the best engineering principles 
and practices (E. 1706, 1707), and it is obvious that 
without the storm sewer system the residents in the 
area below Olympus Hills would have suffered consid-
erably more damage than they did in the storm of August 
17,1969. 
The plaintiffs attempt to prove that Salt Lake 
County participated in the freeway project by showing 
that several Salt Lake County officials attended a pre-
construction conference held on May 29, 1968. There is 
no dispute that these individuals were present at the 
meeting and that several potential problems with sur-
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
face water drainage were recognized and reviewed. The 
construction was to be undertaken by Gibbons & Reed 
pursuant to plans and specifications, which the jury 
found were not defective (R. 728, Interrog. H). The 
State was to supervise the contractor to assure compli-
ance. Salt Lake County had no active responsibility nor 
jurisdiction in connection with the freeway project. With 
out joint conferences of this nature, planning and coordi-
nating the construction of major public improvements 
would be impossible. Salt Lake County extended every 
cooperation to the iState to permit construction of the 
freeway section with as little inconvenience and risk as 
possible to its citizens. Rather, attendance at such meet-
ing is an evidence of Salt Lake County's due care in 
connection with the freeway project. 
3. Creation of a defective or dangerous condition. 
The plaintiffs attempt in their brief to show that the 
storm sewer constructed by Salt Lake County was dan-
gerous and defective. However, all of the evidence in-
dicated that the storm sewer system, itself, was con-
structed in accordance with sound engineering practices. 
Not even the plaintiffs' experts contended that the storm 
sewer system, standing alone, was defective or inade-
quate. Rather, the plaintiffs? experts said that, in their 
opinion, the drainage system of the freeway itself should 
have been protected by gratings to prevent the entrance 
of boulders and gravel. (Brief for Appellants at 23). 
The plaintiffs do not claim that it was the duty or pre-
rogative of Salt Lake County to instruct or supervise 
the State of Utah, in designing the freeway drainage 
system, whether protective gratings should be used. In 
10 
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any event the jury found the State's plans were not 
defective. Further, counties are subdivisions of the 
State, and as such are subservient to the State. Salt 
Lake County v. Liquor Control Commission, 11 Utah 2d 
235, 357 P.2d 488 (1960). 
Plaintiffs claim that Salt Lake County partici-
pated in creating a defective or dangerous condition in 
nine ways (Brief for Appellants at 26). 
Plaintiffs' allegations will be answered in the 
order in which they have been presented in appellants' 
brief: 
(1) " [ I ] t failed totally to maintain its storm 
drain system.'' 
This allegation is without foundation. The sys-
tem had fully and properly functioned prior to the storm 
of August 17 (R. 1687, 1727). An inspection following 
the storm revealed that it ceased to function properly 
because large boulders and gravel, which had been forced 
through lateral lines on the freeway drainage system, 
had plugged the 36" county line. There was no evidence 
that the plugging was caused from any lack of proper 
maintenance or that any prior reasonable maintenance 
would have prevented the plugging. 
(2) [I]t failed to determine whether Line 0 
when connected was free from obstruction." 
After Line C was connected with the State free-
way lines the sewer system functioned completely sat-
11 
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isfactorily. Several rain showers had occurred after it 
was connected and the unobstructed passage of runoff 
waters was clearly evident (R. 1687, 1727). The plain-
tiffs did not present any evidence that Line C was ob-
structed prior to the storm of August 17. It is an impo-
sition on the court to urge this point. 
(3) " [ I ] t failed to require that lead intakes 
were protected from accepting debris and rocks." 
Plaintiffs introduced some speculative evidence 
to the effect that the lateral drains within the freeway 
should have been granted to prevent debris from enter-
ing. However, the State of Utah highway engineers tes-
tified that such grating device were not specified in the 
plans because engineering technique and experience dem-
onstrates that they are not needed on controlled access 
highways, and to some extent they impede the intake 
flow of runoff water. (R. 1743-45; 1768-69). The engi-
neers indicated that such gratings are usually provided 
in connection with under-highway culverts where debris 
from a natural channel is expected. 
Although the plans provided by the State did 
not require grates, the jury specifically found that the 
plans and specifications were not defective. (R. 728, In-
terrog. H). Plaintiffs1 claim that Salt Lake County is 
liable for failing to require grates is therefore without 
merit. 
It should be noted that the contractor agreed 
as a part of its construction responsibility to " protect 
the Project" during construction. (Ex. D, Sheet No. 1). 
12 
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If any duty existed to prevent boulders, gravel and silt 
from entering the storm drainage system during con-
struction of the freeway as a result of the storm of 
August 17, it was that of the contractor. 
(4) " [ I ] t permitted rocks and debris to enter 
the system.'' 
This allegation is merely a restatement of the 
claimed deficiency enumerated in (3). Obviously, there 
can be no legal fault assigned where no duty exists. 
(5) " [W]hen the County agreed to the connec-
tion with its line, it knew it had constructed Line C with 
a very flat grade.'' 
There was no evidence presented which supports 
any claim that Line C was not designed and constructed 
in accordance with acceptable engineering standards. The 
fact that a section of this line clogged because rocks and 
gravel became lodged in it does not establish liability. 
Obviously, it would not have become plugged had the 
rocks and gravel not entered the line. Therefore, this 
claim is a restatement of claim (3) and is a belabored 
attempt to assign fault where none exists. 
(6) " [ I ] t permitted the State to connect a 
larger drainpipe upstream to a smaller pipe." 
The State of Utah, out of an abundance of cau-
tion, replaced a section of the 36" county line which 
passed under the area where the freeway was construct-
ed, with a 42" line. There is no evidence which would 
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support a finding that had this not been done the clog-
ging would have been prevented. 
(7) " [ I ] t permitted the State to drain runoff 
water into a system which was already inadequate." 
When the engineers prepared the plans and spe-
cifications for the storm drainage system which was to 
serve the area here involved, the anticipated maximum 
development of the area, projected to 2000 A.D., was 
considered, as well as the eventual construction of the 
freeway. Estimates of anticipated runoff were made 
and pipe capacities were determined utilizing the accept-
able standard of a ten year storm return frequency. 
Plaintiffs' experts did not have any quarrel with this 
design criteria. All available data was utilized in ar-
riving at the engineering estimates upon which the plans 
were based. The freeway was constructed after the 
County storm drainage system was installed As noted 
above, the system as designed contemplated drainage 
from a section of the freeway. When the freeway was 
designed the estimated runoff could then be more ac-
curately determined. When the estimated freeway run-
off was added to the anticipated ten year storm return 
frequency runoff from county property, the design capa-
city of the County system was slightly exceeded, but 
the expected combined runoff was within the as built 
capacity of the system. (B. 1700-1706). Of course, if a 
storm exceeds the intensity for which the system was 
designed, some flooding is to be expected. The storm of 
August 17 was more than a "100 year" storm and greatly 
exceeded the capacity of the system. Even so, had the 
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lines not become plugged, there is no evidence that the 
County storm system would not have handled a suffi-
cient quantity of the runoff to have prevented the flood-
ing of which plaintiffs complain. Neither is there any 
satisfactory evidence in the record that the system as 
built was insufficient to handle the reasonably expected 
runoff from a ten year storm. 
(8) " [I]t relied upon unsound data." 
The essence of this claim is stated in claim (7). 
However, to set this allegation in its proper setting the 
following statement appears appropriate: 
During all of the approximately 100 years in 
which rainfall data has been accumulated by the United 
States weather gathering services, the stations have been 
located in the downtown Salt Lake City area. Until fairly 
recently such information has not been accumulated in 
the canyon areas near the mountains. The engineers 
used isohyetal maps and rainfall data as published by 
the National Weather Service whose background data 
was gathered as noted above. Plaintiffs claim this in-
formation was unreliable because it did not take into 
account the possibility that heavier rainfall occurs near 
the east mountains surrounding the city. They do not, 
however, suggest what data the engineers should have 
used, since no other data existed. Further, no satisfac-
tory evidence was introduced indicating that acceptable 
engineering practice in designing storm drainage sys-
tems would have excluded the use of such data. The 
evidence by all engineers who had constructed similar 
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drainage systems, was that such data was invariably 
used. 
Additionally, there was no evidence offered 
which would support a finding that had some other rain-
fall data been used, the flooding in this case would have 
been prevented or diminished. 
(9) " [ I ] t permitted the removal of protective 
diking and curbing.'' 
This claim relates entirely to the construction 
phase of the project by the State's contractor, Gibbons 
& Eeed. This reference is apparently to an asphalt curb 
on old Wasatch Boulevard which was removed as a part 
of the construction of relocated Wasatch Boulevard. 
The contractor had the duty under its contract, to pro-
tect the work during construction. This was a matter 
between the State and its contractor concerning which 
Salt Lake County had no duty or right of supervision 
or control. Further, the plaintiffs can point to no evi-
dence which would support a finding that the removal 
of the curb caused the flooding. 
Plaintiffs point to the above nine items to establish 
that Salt Lake County participated in the creation of a 
dangerous and defective condition. 
Two of these relate to the maintenance of the storm 
sewer system prior to the August 17 flood. (1 & 2) But 
plaintiffs do not point to a scrap of evidence to indicate 
that lack of maintenance of the storm sewer system had 
any relationship to the flood on August 17. 
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Six of the nine are allegations that Salt Lake 
County permitted the State or its contractor to engage 
in various activities. (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9). However, the 
County had no right of supervision or control over the 
State of Utah or its contractor Gibbons & Reed. The 
County did extend cooperation to the State prior to and 
during the construction, but in so doing the County did 
not assume responsibility for the acts of the State or 
its contractor. Further, such conduct falls within the 
"discretionary function'' exemption of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. This provision will be discussed later 
in this brief. 
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that Salt Lake County 
relied on unsound data to predict storm intensity (8). 
But never do plaintiffs claim that any superior data 
was available or that reliance upon the data used was 
not in conformance with accepted engineering standards. 
4. Salt Lake County's awareness of the danger. The 
plaintiffs' contention that Salt Lake County was fully 
aware of the possible flooding danger in this case is a 
misstatement of the evidence. 
Olympus Hills was a rapidly growing suburban area 
in Salt Lake County. Certainly, Salt Lake County was 
aware that whenever the natural vegetation is removed 
from hillsides and replaced with homes, driveways and 
other structures, a greater runoff factor is created. This 
was taken into account by the engineers in designing 
the storm sewer system. But plaintiffs cannot point to 
any evidence in the record to indicate that Salt Lake 
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County had prior knowledge of, or that would justify 
the court in charging it with the numerous single oc-
curring elements which combined to create the flooding 
in this case. 
Each of the plaintiffs testified that they had never 
sustained damage from, surface water runoff in the past. 
(Brief for Appellants at 9; E. 826, 835, 846, 855, 860, 
880, 954, 980, 1018, 1024, 1058, 1063, 1078, 1432). Plain-
tiff Paul Kunkel did inform the County of a flooding 
problem prior to August 17, 1969, but this cannot be 
construed as notice to the County of any problem that 
caused the August 17 flood. Plaintiff Kunkel lives in 
an entirely different area from the other plaintiffs and 
his damage was caused by a completely different set of 
circumstances. 
Plaintiffs also rely on a newspaper article of July 
31, 1965, as an evidence of the County's knowledge of 
rainfall potential in the area. (Brief for Appellants at 
28). The admission of this exhibit was based upon 
hearsay and was highly prejudicial. Defendant prop-
erly objected to its admission (E, 1843). But even so, 
the fact that a storm of similar intensity to that of 
August 17, had previously occurred does not affect the 
right of the County to rely upon the adequacy of plans 
and specifications prepared by qualified engineers it 
has employed for the purpose of designing storm drain-
age facilities. There was no attempt to show that the 
storm sewer plans did not meet reasonable engineer-
ing standards, or that the County was negligent in re-
lying upon them. 
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The evidence indicated that the flood was caused 
by a rainstorm of unusual intensity at a time when the 
freeway was especially vulnerable to flooding. Whatever 
knowledge Salt Lake County had of possible flooding 
danger from other sources, there is no evidence that 
Salt Lake County was aware of, or should be charged 
with knowledge of, the danger that caused this flood. 
5. The plaintiffs' injuries. For the purpose of this 
trial it was assumed that each of the plaintiffs had been 
damaged. 
C. SALT LAKE COUNTY IS IMMUNE FROM 
SUIT UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 
63-30-1, et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) pro-
vides : 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, 
all governmental entities shall be immune from 
suit for any injury which may result from the 
activities of said entities wherein said entity is 
engaged in the exercise and discharge of a gov-
ernmental function. (Sec. 63-30-3). 
The Act then waives immunity in several broad 
areas, including dangerous condition of highways, cul-
verts, etc, Sec. 63-30-8, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended), dangerous condition of structures and public 
improvements, Sec. 63-30-9, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended), and negligent acts or omissions of employees, 
Sec. 63-30-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). This 
waiver of immunity, however, is not an admission of 
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liability. The plaintiff nrnst still establish liability as 
in cases against individuals. The statute states: 
. . . [C]onsent to be sued is granted and liability 
of the entity shall be determined as if the entity 
were a private person. Sec. 63-30-4, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953 as amended). 
This court, in Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 
2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971) set out the three theories 
of recovery in a case of this nature: 
An action for the invasion of a person's interest 
in the private use and enjoyment of his land is 
an action for private nuisance. 
Any of three types of conduct may result in lia-
bility for private nuisance. . . . Liability for 
nuisance may rest upon an intentional invasion 
of the plaintiff's interests, or a negligent one, 
or conduct which is abnormal and out of place 
in the surroundings, and so falls fairly within the 
principal of strict liability. 26 Utah 2d at 291-92, 
488 P.2d at 745. 
In Sanford, there had been a previous flood caused 
by the same condition. The court relied upon knowledge 
of this prior flood to conclude that the invasion of the 
plaintiff's interest was intentional in the sense that: 
defendant has created or continued the condition 
causing the nuisance with full knowledge that the 
harm to the plaintiff's interest is substantially 
certain to follow. 26 Utah 2d at 291, 488 P.2d at 
745. 
The present case differs from Sanford in that in 
this case the plaintiffs have never alleged nor proved 
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that the defendants proceeded with the full knowledge 
that harm to the plaintiffs' interest was substantially 
certain to follow. Rather, they claim that the defend-
ants, or their employees were negligent in failing to 
properly construct 1-215 and the storm sewer system. 
Because the plaintiffs rely on negligence as an es-
sential element of their cause of action, they also must 
rely on the waiver of immunity for negligence in Sec. 
63-30-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). And they 
are bound by the exceptions to immmunity in that section. 
1. Salt Lake County is immune when the exer-
cise of a discretionary function is involved. Sec. 
63-30-10(1) preserves political subdivisions' govern-
mental immunity for a discretionary function. That sec-
tion provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused by a 
negligent act or omission of an employee com-
mitted within the scope of his employment except 
if the injury: 
(1) arises out of the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a discre-
tionary function, whether or not the discretion 
is abused,... 
In Velasquez v. Union Pac. RR., 24 Utah 2d 217, 
469 P.2d 5 (1970) the Utah Supreme Court interpreted 
this provision. The court there held that failure of the 
Utah Public Service Commission to require less than the 
most improved warning sign available at a railroad 
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crossing was a discretionary function and would not give 
rise to liability. 
Conversely, in Carroll v. State, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 
P.2d 888 (1972), this court held that the decision of a 
road supervisor to use earthen berms as a means of 
warning drivers of an abandoned road was not a dis-
cretionary function. In so holding, the court stated: 
In the instant action, the decision of the road 
supervisor to use berms as a sole means of pro-
tection for the unwary traveler was not a basic 
policy decision essential to the realization or ac-
complishment of some basic governmental policy, 
program, or objective. His decision did not re-
quire the exercise of basic policy evaluation, 
judgment and expertise on the part of the Eoad 
Commission. His determination may properly be 
characterized as one at the operational level of 
decision making. 27 Utah 2d at 389-90, 496 P.2d 
at 891. 
In so holding the Utah court followed the numerous 
federal cases that apply the "operational-policy" dis-
tinction that determines whether a function is discretion-
ary for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. 2671, et seq., a statute after which the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act was clearly patterned. See, 
e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 
(1955); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); 
Sisley v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 273 (I). Alas. 1962). 
Plaintiffs' claims against Salt Lake County fall 
within one of the following claimed areas of deficiency: 
(1) Failure to properly inspect the system; (2) Its 
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agreement with the State in which freeway drainage 
was tied into the County system; (3) Failure to super-
vise and control the State's project; and (4) Reliance 
upon certain engineering data which was included in the 
storm drainage plans approved by the County Commis-
sion. With the exception of (1), which will be consid-
ered later, such actions were clearly not taken at the 
"operational level," but involved the exercise of basic 
policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise and are "dis-
cretionary functions" as defined in the Act. And inso-
far as category (3) is concerned, the County had no 
right of control or supervision over the State's project. 
2. Salt Lake County is not liable for failure to 
inspect. Sec. 63-30-10(4), Utah Code Ann. (1963 as 
amended) provides another exception from liability when 
the action upon which liability is based: "arises out of 
a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any prop-
e r ty , . . . " 
As noted above, there is no evidence that Salt 
Lake County knew of any dangerous condition in its 
storm sewer system, even if one were shown •*» i-xist. 
Neither can plaintiffs contend that the County should 
have known of such a dangerous condition by conduct-
ing an inspection. To the extent plaintiffs base their 
action upon Salt Lake County's failure to inspect, they 
are barred by Sec. 63-30-10(4), Utah Code Ann. (1953 
as amended). In any event, there is no evidence that 
an inspection, even if conducted, would have revealed 
any dangerous defect in the system. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS CANNOT RECOVER UNDER 
THE DOCTRINE OF INVERSE CONDEM-
NATION. 
Inverse condemnation is an action brought against 
a governmental entity to recover the value of property 
which has been appropriated without the formal exer-
cise of the eminent domain power. Ossma/n v. Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 511 P.2d 517, 519 
(Colo. App. 1973); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 
Ore. 178, 375 P.2d 100 (1962). 
The plaintiffs do not have a right of recovery under 
the facts of this case apart from the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1, et seq.). 
The law in Utah was clearly stated by Mr. Justice 
Henriod in Fairclough v. Salt Lake County,, 10 Utah 2d 
417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). In that case the Utah Road 
Commission reduced the grade of a highway to about 
16 feet below the abutting owner's land. Consequently, 
access to the property was limited and the value re-
duced accordingly. In reversing the trial court's denial 
of a motion to dismiss the court held: 
[Consistently and historically we have ruled . . . 
that Art. I Sec, 22 of our Constitution is not 
self-executing, nor does it give consent to be sued, 
implied or otherwise; and that to secure such 
consent is a legislative matter 
This doctrine was followed consistently in every case 
that put the issue before this Court. E.g., Holt v. Utah 
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State Road Comnrn., 30 uian 2<± -±, oil i\2u 12bb v.1973); 
Hampton v. State, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968). 
The Court wisely forbore assessing damages against 
the State or its subdivisions until the will of the people 
could be expressed by the legislature. If the Court were 
now to hold that a governmental entity is liable for 
negligent property injury outside of and beyond the Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act, ii *<>i\Ui U* substituting its 
own judgment for that of the legislature. As Mr. Justice 
Crockett said in Hjorth v. Whittenburgf 1.21 Utah 324, 
241 P.2d 907, 909 (1953): 
This phase of our law is well established and of 
long standing. If it is to be changed, that must 
come through the sovereign power of this com-
monwealth, the people, speaking through the leg-
islature. 
1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE STATE. 
The jury found that the "highway project created 
by the State of Utah was unreasonably defective or dan-
gerous.' J (R. 727). As a result of this finding the trial 
court entered judgment against the State. 
The State did noi "create" the conditions which 
plaintiffs claim gave rise to the flooding. Rather, the 
State planned the project and engaged Gibbons & Reed 
to construct the highway who thereafter failed to prop-
erly "protect the project" during construction. (R. 782, 
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Interrog. J ) . The contract called for a completed facility. 
The State provided plans and specifications which the 
jury specifically found were not defective in any way. 
(R. 728, Interog. H) The planning of 1-215 is clearly a 
discretionary function, and since there was no showing 
of negligence which can be properly attributed to the 
state, the judgment against it should^be permitted to 
stand. 
A. THE JURY DID NOT FIND THAT THE 
STATE OF UTAH WAS GUILTY OF NEG-
LIGENCE. 
As stated above, in relationship to Salt Lake County, 
in order for a governmental entity to be liable, the 
plaintiff must show that : 
(1) liability would exist if the entity were a pri-
vate person, Sec. 63-30-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended) and 
(2) that immunity is waived under either Sec. 
63-30-8 or 63-30-9 or 63-30-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended). In addition, if the plaintiff relies on the 
waiver of immunity under Sec. 63-30-10, he must show 
that his action does not fall within one of the exceptions 
thereunder. 
As noted above, in a case of this nature, plaintiffs 
must prove their case under one of three theories: the 
invasion must be intentional; or it must be negligent; 
or it must be so unusual as to give rise to strict liability. 
In this case the plaintiffs do not claim that the in-
vasion of their interest was intentional. Nor do they 
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claim that freeway construction is a proper case for 
strict liability. Bather, they base their action on negli-
gence. 
The jury, however, did not find that the State of 
Utah was negligent. The trial court submitted 16 inter-
rogatories to the jury under the special verdict. Three 
of these related to the State. In Interrogatory "H ? ;h^ 
jury specifically found that the plans which tlu* Slate 
provided were in accordance with approved engineer-
ing standards. (R. 728). In Interrogatories "A** :wl 
" D " the jury found that the highway project wais m 
reasonably defective or dangerous. (E. 721, 727). A 
finding of "unreasonably defective and dangerous" does 
not establish a cause of action against a private person. 
Nor does a finding of i l unreasonably defective and dan-
gerous" establish negligence. Such a finding is the hall-
mark of strict liability. See, Restatement of Torts, Sec-
ond, §402A. Although such a finding may be in some 
circumstances a basis for liability, such as in the sale 
of a dangerous product, it is not applicable to facts sur-
rounding the construction of a freeway by the State, as 
contemplated under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
B. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY WAS N OT 
WAIVED FOR THE PLANNING OF 1-215, 
SINCE PLANNING IS A DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION. 
Because plaintiffs rely upon negligence as the basis 
for their cause of action, the exceptions listed in Sec. 
63-30-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), are ap-
plicable. Subsection (1) provides that negligent acts or 
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omissions of an employee of a governmental entity com-
mitted within the scope of his employment is waived 
" . . . except if the injury: (1) arises out of the exercise 
or performance or the failure to perform a discretion-
ary function, whether or not the discretion is abused,....'-' 
This provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act was patterned after Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. 2671, et. seq., so federal cases are instructive. 
Sisley v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 273 (D. Alaska 
1962) was a case brought under the Tort Claims Act 
almost identical on its facts to the one at the bar. The 
plaintiffs there had been injured by a flood caused by 
defective drainage in a highway built by the United 
States. The Court held: 
Plaintiffs concede that the acts of constructing 
the highway and deciding where the highway 
should be built are discretionary functions, but 
contend that when the government undertakes an 
act it may not be negligent in the performance 
thereof or must exercise due care, in what the 
Supreme Court has characterized as the "oper-
ational level" of governmental activity. 
Clearly the acts here complained of relating to 
the planning of the construction of the grade 
,. and culverts in the improvement of the Glenn 
v Highway are not negligent acts committed by a 
Government employee on the "operational level" 
but are acts calling for the exercise of judgment 
and discretion in the planning of the highway. 
Errors in judgment, if such may be found, are 
not negligence in construction. These plans were 
the result of policy judgment and decision and 
v as we have noted, where there is room for such 
there is discretion. This view conforms to what 
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is believed to be the true intent of this important 
exception. Otherwise the Government would be 
liable to a property owner for every error of 
judgment in the planning and construction of 
public roads. 202 F. Supp. at 274-75. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also adopted this 
i4operational-planning'' distinction in Carroll v. State, 
27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972). 
When the legislature chose to except from liability 
negligent acts that arise out of discretionary functions, 
it recognized that enormous projects such as freeway 
construction may not be accomplished without the pos 
sibility of harm to some individuals. Nevertheless, the 
legislature recognized that the common good requires 
that such projects be built. It, therefore, excepted from 
liability, negligent acts in the planning of such projects 
so that the state would not "be liable to a property 
owner for every error of judgment in the planning and 
construction of public roads." Sisley v. United States, 
202 F. Supp. at 275. 
The decisions that were mat le here involved the 
exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and ex-
pertise on the part of the State. Such factors as rela-
tive cost, safety, maintenance expense, and feasibility 
had to be carefully weighed. The Court should recog-
nize the policy decision made by the Utah Legislature 
in making the State immune from suit in this discretion-
ary area and should not hold the State liable for the 
planning of 1-215. 
0. THE STATE OF UTAH CANNOT BE HELD 
LIABLE FOR INADEQUATE INSPECTION. 
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In addition to planning 1-215, the only other aspect 
in which the State became involved was general inspec-
tion and supervision to assure the project was completed 
according to the plans and specifications. To the ex-
tent the plaintiffs rely upon any failure of the State 
to make inspection, or making a negligent inspection, 
their action is barred by Sec. 63-30-10(4), Utah Code 
Ann. (1953 as amended), which preserves immunity in 
such instances. 
Because all activities in which the State was en-
gaged in this project — planning and inspection — are 
areas of immunity under the Governmental Immunity 
Act, the judgment against the State cannot stand. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ENTERING 
JUDGMENT FOR INDEMNITY AGAINST 
GIBBONS & REED COMPANY. 
The contract between the State of Utah and Gib-
bons & Reed Construction Company for the construc-
tion of the highway incorporated by reference the Stand-
ard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, 
Interim Issue, March 1968 (Ex. D, Sheet No. 1). 
Those Standard Specifications provide in part as 
follows: 
107.14 Responsibility for Damage Claims: The 
Contractor shall indemnify and save harmless 
the 'State, its officers, and employees, from all 
suits, actions, or claims of any character brought 
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because of any injuries or damage received or 
sustained by any person, persons, or property on 
account of the operations of the said Contractor; 
or on account of or in consequence of any neglect 
in safeguarding the work; . .. (Emphasis added). 
Indemnity agreements, like all other contracts, are 
construed with a view to determining the actual inten-
tion of the parties. Southern Calif. Gas. Co. v. Ventura 
Pipe Line Const. Co., 309 P.2d 849, 851 (Cal App. 1957); 
Luke v. American Surety Co., 114 P.2d 950 (Okla. 1941). 
As stated in 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indemnity, §13: 
A contract of indemnity is construed in accord-
ance with the rules for the construction of con-
tracts generally. The cardinal rule is id ascer-
tain the intention of the parties and to give ef-
fect to that intention if it can be done consist-
ently with legal principles. To do this, it has 
been held that the courts must consider not only 
the language of the contract, but the facts and 
surrounding circumstances under which the con-
tract was made. Of course, where the terms of 
the contract are considered by the court to be 
clear and unequivocal, no question of construing 
or interpreting the agreement arises. 
Contracts of indemnity, if ambiguous or uncer-
tain, must receive a reasonable construction so 
as to carry out rather than defeat the purpose 
for which they were executed. To this end they 
should neither, on the one hand, be so narrowly 
or technically interpreted as to frustrate their 
obvious design, nor, on the other hand, so loosely 
or inartificially interpreted as to relieve the obli-
gor from a liability within the scope or spirit of 
their terms. 
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Manifestly, the intention of the contract provision 
in this case is to protect the State from suits exactly 
like this one. Nothing could be a better example of 
"damage received or sustained by any person, persons, 
or property on account of the operations of the said 
Contractor," than a flood caused by the construction of 
the highway. This alone should be enough to require in-
demnification under the contract. 
The Utah court has consistently held that if a con-
tract of indemnity is to relieve a party of its own negli-
gence, that intention must be clearly and unequivocably 
expressed. Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 205, 
398 P.2d 207, 208 (1965); Union Pac. R.R. v. El Paso 
Nat, Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 555, 259, 408 P.2d 910, 913 
(1965); Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 263, 
264, 420 P.2d 848, 849 (1966). 
In each of these cases the party seeking indemnifi-
cation was guilty of active negligence and the party 
against whom indemnity was sought was wholly without 
negligence. In contrast, in this case, the contractor had 
control of the instrumentality causing the damage and 
was guilty of primary negligence. Furthermore the jury 
did not find that the State was negligent. Rather the 
jury found that the highway project was unreasonably 
defective or dangerous. The reasonable conclusion to 
be drawn from the jury finding that the project was 
"unreasonably defective or dangerous" in light of its 
further finding that the plans and specifications were 
prepared in accordance with approved engineering 
standards (E. 728), is that the negligence of Gibbons & 
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Beed in failing to take reasonable precautions to pro-
tect the project during construction was the active and 
effective, if not the sole cause, of the flooding. (R. 728, 
Interrog. J ) . • ;•""• • • 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly entered judgment for Salt 
Lake County because there was no evidence that Salt 
Lake County was negligeni in failing to provide ade-
quate drainage facilities. Furthermore, all the activi-
ties undertaken by Salt Lake County in connection with 
the freeway project were either discretionary in nature 
or exempt from liability under the "inspection" provi-
sions of Section 10 of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
The trial court erred in entering judgment against 
the State of Utah because there was no satisfactory evi-
dence that the State of Utah created a dangerous con-
dition. The State's only activities in connection with 
the construction of the freeway were planning and in-
spection. The jury found that the plans and specifica-
tions provided by the State were in accordance with ap-
proved engineering standards. Additionally, highway 
planning is a discretionary function and cannot serve 
as a basis for liability under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. Neither can plaintiffs rely on the fail-
ure to make an inspection, or making a negligent 
inspection, 1»y the State of Utah a> a basi* for liability, 
because immunity for such conduct is preserved by the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Further, there was 
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no evidence offered which would support such a finding 
in any event. 
Defendant Gibbons & Reed constructed the proj-
ect, and under its contract with the State unequivocally 
agreed to indemnify the State for damages the State 
may incur because of the contractor's activities during 
contraction and specifically for any failure to protect 
the project. The jury found that Gibbons & Reed failed 
to "protect the project" during construction and that 
such was a proximate cause of the flooding and damage. 
It is respectfully submitted that if plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover, their remedy is exclusively against 
Defendant, Gibbons & Reed. 
Finally, if it is determined that the State has lia-
bility to the plaintiffs this Court should grant judgment 
in favor of the State of Utah on its crossclaim against 
Gibbons & Reed, because of the indemnity contract be-
tween Gibbons & Reed and the State. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MERLIN R, LYBBERT 
DAVID W. SLAGLE 
7th Floor, Continental Bank 
Y Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
f Respondents, State of Utah 
and Salt Lake County 
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